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The paper presents the implementations of János Kornai’s theory about Soft Budget Constraint 
(SBC) through the example of the special and popular topic of professional football. It shows 
the theory of Soft Budget and its application in professional sport. It illustrates the market and 
bureaucratic co-ordinating mechanisms and explains the specialities of the state and the market 
model of professional football through the transition of Central and Eastern European countries. 
The aim of the paper is to highlight the main differences of the operation of Western and Eastern 
European football and to present the application of the SBC theory in the two region. The 
research summarizes the main specialities of professional sport and football, the markets of 
professional football, the double objective and possible strategies of sport companies and return 
on investment in players. Professional football’s specialities in the post-socialist countries and 
current business results of CEE football were examined. With the method of data collection and 
processing, main market results were investigated. The paper identify successful Central-
Eastern-European championships and clubs which operate with business model. This 
identification helps to evaluate the efficiency of Hungarian football in the regional environment 
and it helps to understand why SBC causes inefficiency. 
 
Keywords 
Soft Budget Constraint, professional football, Financial Fair Play, Central and Eastern Europe 
                                                             
1 The working paper is a revised version of the authors’ conference paper for „The importance of Kornai's 
research today – Kornai90” Conference (21-22 February, 2018). 
2 
 
Introduction 
Nowadays professional football is facing serious challenges in Western Europe and in our 
narrower region, Central and Eastern Europe. For the former the appearance of so-called „sugar 
daddies” and irresponsible management, in the latter case weakening competitiveness, the 
decreasing number of domestic consumers and recurring public funding are the main problems 
(András & Havran 2014, 2016). Because of the above-mentioned challenges, The Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) created the regulation of Financial Fair Play (FFP) 
and in connection with this, several well-known economists (for example Storm and Nielsen 
2012, 2015; Andreff 2015) applied the SBC theory of Kornai. 
The aims of the paper are to examine the business operation of professional football 
with the examination of nine Central-Eastern-European (CEE) countries and to introduce the 
adaptation of the Soft Budget Constraint in professional football. First, we show the actual 
trends and special sport professional objectives of international club football. Second, we 
examined post-socialistic countries with the aim of identifying level of market-based revenue 
and transfer incomes. The research question of the paper is how can the Soft Budget Constraint 
(SBC) can help to understand the sport professional and financial trends of professional football 
in Western-Europe and Central-Eastern-Europe? The selected nine CEE countries together can 
be considered a significant market: between 2009 and 2014 the transfer revenue of football 
clubs from CEE region was more than 70% of Bundesliga’ transfer revenue (András-Havran, 
2016). More than 25 years after the regime change and 10 years after joining the European 
Union they still have their particular arrangements, mixed ownership (business-state). 
Moreover, many championships and clubs in the region work with considerable political 
interference, and at the same time they give many talented players to the best championships.  
In this paper we give a regional overview in which we explore comparable Central-
Eastern-European championships’ and clubs’ sport professional and business performance.  
Countries involved in the study are the following: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Besides geographical position these 
nine countries have cultural and economic similarities as well, all of them were socialist 
countries and are members of the European Union, except for Serbia which is a candidate 
country. During the socialism every CEE football leagues operated by state support, now we 
are looking for the answer which clubs could change their operation to business. 
 
 
3 
 
Literature review 
In our paper we make a detailed literature review according to the following logic. First, the 
research summarizes the main specialities of professional sport and football, the markets of 
professional football, the double objective (András, 2004) and possible strategies of sport 
companies (Szabados, 2004). Furthermore, it shows the state and business model in 
professional football and the current business trends of football (Havran, 2017). Second, the 
research introduce the CEE related literature about professional football. Finally, the paper 
describes the phenomenon of Soft Budget Constraint (Kornai, 1980, 1986b) and the 
understanding of SBC in professional football. 
 
Operation models and specialties of professional football 
Based on Kornai (1986a), the market has become the dominant co-ordinating mechanism of the 
20th century. „This statement is true even in fields of society that are far from economy. By 
now, the same can be told about football” (András, 2003). The Author described two main 
operation models of football. The „state model” is „characterised by the important role of the 
state in the direction of sports and its operations and funding”. In this case, revenues are coming 
from different state sources and the model is typically apparent in the Eastern European 
countries, among them in Hungary.  In case of the business model, most of the revenues have 
their direct or indirect origin in the world of business. Based on Chikán (2008), we can 
summarize the differences of the two models in the table 1.  In the case of the state model, the 
sporting successes achieved in professional football served to legitimate the political system 
and to improve public feelings. Meanwhile, football, as a professional sport, formed a part of 
the entertainment industry. 
In state model (András, 2003), revenues do not necessary mean limits for the costs and 
the system is characterised by soft budget limits (Kornai – Matits, 1987). In case of the business 
model, the real owner makes a profitable operation and interested in the profitability of his 
invested capital and she expects that revenues should cover the cost in the long term. 
 
Table 1.: Comparison of the two operation models of football 
 State model Business model 
Financing sources Revenues from the state Business revenues 
Role of the budget limit Soft budget limit Hard budget limit 
Characteristic of 
ownership 
No real owner Presence of real ownership 
 
Operational frame Non-profit: social clubs For-profit: legal forms of companies 
Primary role of football Legitimisation of political system 
improvement of public feeling 
Service as a field of the entertainment 
industry 
Source: András (2003) 
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András (2015) completed the table with the non-profit model which explain that the dominant 
aim of the European football clubs is the sport success. Therefore, in case of socialistic period, 
András (2003) applied the phenomenon of SBC in football, much earlier than others in Western 
Europe. In the third part of the literature review we describe the differences of SBC application 
in Western and Eastern Europe. 
András (2004) draws the attention to an important feature of football corporations’ 
operations, which is that they operate with a dual, sometimes opposite objective: demands for 
both sports and business efficiency are present at the same time. These two objectives cannot 
be separated, as where there is a market coordination mechanism, it is important that the 
consumers support the companies, however, in several cases the owners are not profit-oriented. 
András (2003) summarizes the main revenue sources of football clubs in the following way. 
The most important market is the consumers market because this is the base for another markets. 
The demand towards ticket revenues are ensured by the solvent demand and the convenient 
facilities and marketing strategy of the basic and complementary services. The viewing figures 
and the marketable advertising minutes covering the broadcasting costs determine the interest 
on behalf of the media. In the case of the merchandising revenues, the clear legal situation and 
the strong consumer loyalty are the principle factors of success. 
The net income on player transfers can be an important revenue source of the football 
companies. But it is not only influenced by internal factors of the football company, but external 
ones also. Among the markets of professional sport, CEE sport companies can hope for an 
income mainly from the international players market (András et al. 2012). By income from 
players market in this paper we mean a given club’s trade balance on the players market, that 
is, the value of players sold, decreasing it by the amounts spent on buying. So money spent on 
youth training is not part of this definition. During the analysis of regional literature we looked 
for English language studies concerning professional football in nine countries between 2003 
and 2015. Some of the articles are about the regionally decisive change of the regime and its 
effects on sport, while others examine the economic and business functioning of clubs. 
We highlight three different types of potential business strategies of football clubs 
(Szabados, 2004): 1) strategies based on the high number of consumers (circle of success, 
commercial, l’art pour l’art), 2) transfer strategy based on selling players and 3) synergy 
strategy based on the interest of owner in another industry. The focus in Chikán’s (2008) 
interpretation of economic globalization from the point of view of the corporate world are the 
economic decision-makers, who consider and weigh up the possibilities of the whole world 
when making their decisions. Markets of professional sport (András, 2004) are also, to different 
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extents, globalized. Competition systems of professional football allow access to regional and 
global markets regarding both club and national team football based on their geographical 
expansion. In case of clubs making a financial report for UEFA in 19 years clubs’ revenue grew 
by 9.5%, since 2002 it doubled and since 1996 it grew to five times it was (UEFA 2014, 32). 
This was mainly caused by the UEFA raising the prizes in its international competitions, which 
meant million 500 EUR in the period between 2004 and 2006 and grew to million 1200 EUR 
by the 2013-2015 period, which means an annual growth of 12% on average (UEFA 2013, 20). 
The current trends of professional football can be identified as follows (Havran, 2017): 
- Globalisation and internationalisation of football and players market has intensified  
- Income of football clubs has grown significantly 
- HR expenses of football clubs have grown significantly (transfers and payroll) 
- Accumulated loss of football clubs has grown because in order to achieve sport success 
they spend larger amounts on purchasing and paying players. 
- Concentration of sport success increased as both on a national and on an international 
level 
- Concentrated sport success leads to an increase in the concentration of income, so the 
number of internationally competitive clubs is decreasing. 
 
 
Professional football in the CEE region 
The research reviews the relevant literature about sport success and financial results of 
leagues and clubs of the examined region (András-Havran, 2016). The paper contributes to the 
literature of business economics, with a special regard to the unique business operations in 
professional sport (Andreff-Szymanski, 2006). The region that used to achieve great success 
both on the level of national teams and clubs in earlier decades now lags behind Western Europe 
both in sport achievements and in a financial sense – mainly due to the lack of international 
consumers. In the capitalist Western-Europe, football clubs could increase the number of the 
international customers (fans) thanks to television and internet. Most significant championships 
and TV broadcastings started in the beginning of 1990’s. After the regime change, in the Eastern 
part of Europe, football clubs were in a difficult situation - without capital, they lose in the 
competition for international fans. The success in international club football concentrated in the 
Western part of the continent. In all academic texts dealing with CEE sport and football, 
attention (including Mihaylov, 2012; Rosca, 2014, etc.) are drawn to formal deficiencies of 
financial reports, increasing loss and in many cases decreasing market income. 
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During the analysis of regional academic literature we looked for studies concerning 
professional football in nine countries in English and Hungarian. Some of the articles are about 
the regionally decisive change of the regime and its effects on sport, while others examine the 
economic and business functioning of clubs. The following authors wrote about the change of 
the regime and its effects on sport: McDonald (2014) in Romania, Girginov (2008) in Bulgaria, 
András (2003) and Vincze et al. (2008) in Hungary, Lenartowicz and Karwacki (2005) in 
Poland, Hodges and Stubbs (2013) in Croatia. Authors came to similar conclusions in all 
countries, according to them the years of the change of the regime were very difficult and the 
first regulations concerning companies that run sport teams were only made in the mid-1990s. 
After 1989 state support for professional sport dropped significantly, so most clubs had serious 
financial difficulties. Instead of the state, local governments appeared as proprietors of clubs to 
strengthen city identity. Besides losing serious state support the sport had to face the increasing 
social problem of hooligans attacking each other more and more intensively. 
Based on the article by Mihaylov (2012) clubs’ success – both sport professionally and 
economically on the above mentioned markets – is greatly influenced by how much they can 
spend on signing good quality players. Richer teams this way rise even higher above the others 
and on the long run their dominance can cause the complete loss of weaker teams according to 
the author. Economic, and together with this also the sport professional gap is growing between 
teams, as fans buy tickets for the matches of top teams, these teams receive the right to be 
broadcast on TV, which provides another great source of income, and they also win the prize 
money deserved by the best team of a championship. In great European championships – 
Champions League, European League – regularly the same clubs get into the finals, where these 
prizes are even higher, and where smaller teams have absolutely no chance to get into. Central-
Easter-European football clubs have no possibility to obtain a significant income from 
broadcasting rights, their matches are not watched regularly by a fixed number of fans, they do 
not have the financial background to sign stars, so their income from the merchandising market 
is also low, and on the sponsors market also the above described reasons make it difficult to 
receive any possibilities. Studying the region we can see that only a few teams per country can 
achieve outstanding results who can also qualify for the lists of international cups. This way the 
argumentation of the above quoted Mihaylov (2012) can be proven on a smaller scale as well, 
that is, the gap between richer and poorer teams keeps growing both in a financial and in a sport 
professional sense. Mihaylov (2012, p. 6) refers to Kornai (1980) in understanding „paradoxical 
co-existence of debts on the one hand and economic stability on the other”. 
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In his study Roşca (2012) examined the player-trade’s financial contribution to 
Romanian economy in five consecutive seasons (2006/2007-2010/2011). It is detectable on a 
macro-economic level that player export influences the financial structure of Romanian football 
and the Romanian economy, as professional football is part of the economy. According to Roşca 
(2012) Romanian football clubs should diversify their incomes, of which one part can be the 
players export: selling Romanian clubs’ players abroad. This produces income for the clubs on 
a micro level (on the level of sport companies). According to his study, the gross export of 
Romanian first division clubs on an annual average in total was 18.1 million Euros between 
2006 and 2011, and realized profit was 4.5 million Euros in the same time period. 
According to Kozma (2015, 218) “there are countries and sports where every market 
paradigm-based theory is irrelevant”, so in the Central-Eastern-European region before starting 
a few specific enquiries, research paradigms need to be chosen depending on the subject of the 
study and the research questions. 
In all academic texts dealing with Central-Eastern-European sport and football, attention 
is drawn to formal deficiencies of financial reports, increasing loss and in many cases 
decreasing market income (Procházka 2012, Stocker 2013, Nemec and Nemec 2009). 
Championships in possession of a larger local consumer base (such as the Polish league) are 
more likely to produce business results, of which an essential criterion is international opening 
(for example the Polish league being broadcast on an international sport channel) (Bednarz, 
2014). In many countries clubs have proprietors whose intentions are questionable, such as in 
case of the multiple champion Romanian Steaua Bucarest (McDonald, 2014). 
 
Appearance of the SBC phenomenon in football 
Originally, Kornai developed the SBC concept to understand the inefficiency of loss-making 
companies in socialist economies which were repeatedly bailed out by the state. In capitalism 
several examples can be found for SBC. Rosta (2015) describes that many actors can be in need 
of a bailout, including profit-oriented companies (banks, multinational companies), public 
institutions offering public services, local or regional governments (e.g. local governments), 
private citizens (household forex debts), countries (for example Greece), non-governmental 
organizations, or even large-scale investment projects. András (2003) applied the SBC in the 
case of socialistic sport and football. Nowadays, we can find a huge number of references which 
apply the SBC to support the understanding of current trends of Western-European football. In 
this chapter we present the most referenced studies in the topic. 
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Storm and Nielsen (2012) uses the SBC phenomenon to explain the paradox why do 
European professional football clubs chronically operate on the brink of insolvency without 
going out of business. The authors examined the survival rate of professional football clubs in 
different leagues and they found that compared with business companies in general, the survival 
rate of football companies was extremely high. For example in 1923 the English championships 
(first four divisions) consisted of 88 teams and in 2007 97% of them still existed. Storm and 
Nielsen (2012, 2017) presented many examples in the most significant championships (English, 
Spanish, France and Italian) for the phenomenon of football clubs’ high survival rate despite of 
the aggregate loss of them. The exception is Germany, where the clubs operate with moderate 
profit without debts thanks to the specific ownership structure: clubs have 51% member 
ownership. 
Franck and Lang (2014) refers to Storm (2012) as follows: „Building on many 
interesting observations about the political, social and economic environment of football clubs, 
the paper provides intuitive insights into the process that leads to the development of soft budget 
constraints and interprets FFP as an important countermeasure.” According to Drut and 
Raballand (2012) some clubs are careless with their budget while others keep the rules strictly 
so the former win the championships. According to Storm (2012) quoting Kornai (1980) a few 
sport companies with soft budgets will dominate. Kornai also refers to Storm (Kornai 2014, 15) 
exactly in his study about rethinking his soft budget theory in which he cites it as interesting 
example that this phenomenon occurs not only in case of Hungarian, but in case of the biggest, 
privately owned international clubs as well. 
Storm (2012) developed an understanding of why the majority of top league clubs are 
in the red and why regulation is needed by UEFA. The author find evidence of SBC in European 
professional football clubs, and claims that „softness punishes the few financially well‐
managed clubs in sporting terms for balancing their books”. SBC takes political, cultural and 
emotional aspects into account in order to understand economic behaviour among professional 
team sports clubs. “The emergence and persistence of the SBC syndrome in professional 
football is due to two main, interconnected factors: 
1) the institutional mechanism of the football market and  
2 the social attachment to the clubs linked to the specific emotional logic of sport 
focused on winning.” (Storm, 2012, p 26). 
 
 
9 
 
Actors of football industry favouring soft budget constraints for football but Franck 
(2014) states that practices cause inefficiencies by the following reasons: 
- Decreasing price elasticity of demand, talent shortage and the formation of “salary 
bubbles” 
- Managerial moral hazard with high levels of risk and low levels of care 
- Managerial rent-seeking: weak incentives to innovate the business 
- The systemic effect of ‘Unlimited’ money injections into payrolls: crowding out of good 
management. 
 
Pieper and Wallebohr (2017) state that the extreme level of European club losses is not 
explicable with the standard reasons like the European football clubs’ predominant win-
maximization calculus, the limited revenue sharing arrangements, the inexistence of territorial 
exclusivity or the liberalized player market. The authors’ opinion (based on several authors’ 
statements) that SBC can help us to understand better this phenomenon.  
Based on Storm and Nielsen (2012) Rohde and Breuer (2016) referenced the SBC in the 
case of English football. They state that the “SBC of European football clubs have been 
hypothesized to be positively impacted by sugar daddy owners, loose taxation, soft or interest-
free loans, and infrastructure subsidies”. 
Torricelli et al (2014) applied the SBC phenomenon in the role of football coaches with 
the comparison of English and Italian situation. In European football the aggregate costs 
(included the coaches’ compensations) between 2007 and 2011 increased more than the 
revenues. “These data have fostered explanations based on the application of the soft budget 
constraint theory”. 
Based on Franck (2014) D’Andrea and Masciandaro (2016) used the „zombie race” 
definition. It means that football clubs usually spend more than they can so „compared to all 
the other firms they do not face the same threat of dissolution if they fail to balance their books 
systematically”. The FFP rules aim to fight against it. Football clubs get positive discrimination 
which is closely related to two main elements: the concept of Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) 
and the actors behind the world of football. Based on D’Andrea and Masciandaro (2016) the 
SBC theory deals with a rather complex causality chain involving the following three factors 
(Kornai at al. 2003): 
- The political, social and economic environment in which SBC expectations are 
generated; 
- The motives backing the choice for organizations to support or even bail out otherwise 
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insolvent actors; 
- The inefficiencies related to the SBC syndrome. 
 
Based on Franck (2014) D’Andrea and Masciandaro (2016) pointed that „there are two main 
reasons that justify government support. First, if you were soft in the past you’re more likely to 
continue to be soft in the present, thus adversely reinforcing future expectations on SBC. 
Second, when a club shuts down, there are negative externalities for the local economy, creating 
strong arguments for governments to step in and take action against failures.” 
 
Storm (2009) found a strong positive correlation between salary costs and winning 
percent of football clubs (r2=0.81) in Danish Football from 1993 to 2005. He classified Danish 
football clubs into two categories: „cost-maximizers”, „soft budget constraint enhancers” and 
„profit maximizers”. Cost-maximizer clubs earn money with the aim to use as much money as 
possible on staff and players. The soft budget club uses more money than its revenue offers and 
the owners/stakeholders continually fund it. In case of profit maximizing clubs the aim is to 
develop activities in profit-oriented ways. 
Yu, L et al (2017) introduce a mixed model of professional football from China which 
can compare to Central-Eastern-European football. Revenues from the market has increased 
steeply in latest years (total revenue of clubs swelled from US$175 million in 2012 to US$1.22 
billion in 2016. In Chine first league in 2016-2017 season, 10 out of the 16 clubs have been 
owned by private actor. Yu, L et al (2017) declares that „the investment in football not only 
helps increase the companies’ brand equity and public image, but also serves as a “stepping 
stone” to gain an array of supports (e.g. tax reduction, land-use rights, and preferential policy) 
from the local government officials, who are aspiring to use football as a “city branding” 
leverage to gain an edge in regional competition, attract external investment, and collect 
political credits to get promoted.” 
The North American championships are „local monopolies with strong entry barriers” 
(Storm and Nielsen, 2017, p 4). They use draft-system and limits to player mobility and these 
conditions are favourable for the profit maximization. In Europe the leagues are opened, the 
market of players is mostly free so European football clubs follow win optimizing behaviour 
and the concentration of club successfulness is very high (Havran, 2017). 
Storm and Nielsen (2017) refer to Kornai (1986b) who identified five criterias to decide 
that firms face hard or soft budget constraints: 
1. The firm is a price-taker for both inputs and outputs (pricing); 
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2. The firm cannot influence the tax rules and no individual exemption can be given 
concerning the volume of tax or dates of collection (taxation); 
3. The firm cannot receive any free state or other grants to cover current expenses 
or as contributions to finance investment (subsidies); 
4. No reedit from other firms or banks can be obtained (credit); 
5. No external financial investment is possible (investment finance).” 
If the all the five conditions are fulfilled, the company in question is constrained on its budget 
in a hard way. Storm and Nielsen (2017) gave the examples for the SBC in Western-European 
profession football and completed Kornai’ criterias by a sixth. The authors applied the SBC 
criterias on football as follows in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Application the phenomenon of SBC in professional football 
SBC Criteria Meaning in football Example Reference 
Soft pricing A public stadium is made available to 
football clubs at below market fees or 
state companies buy naming rights to 
stadia at above market prices. 
Spain, Italy, 
Denmark 
Storm and Nielsen 
(2017) 
Soft taxation Tax exemptions, non-payment of taxes, 
non-enforcement or amnesty of tax debt. 
Spain, Italy Barajas and 
Rodríguez, (2010), 
Foot (2007) 
Soft subsidies Open or hidden forms provided by 
governments of rich ’glory seekers’. 
England, 
France 
Grant (2007), 
Andreff (2007) 
Soft credits Acceptance of overdrafts, unpaid bills and 
non-enforcement of repayment 
arrangements with routine postponement 
and rescheduling of debt. 
Spain Ascari and 
Gagnepain (2006) 
Soft investments The government or other sponsor pay for a 
part, or perhaps all, of the costs when 
clubs build new stadia or other revenue-
boosting infrastructure. 
  
Soft accounting Takes the form of discretionary, and even 
illegal, praxis, with the purpose of 
bypassing rules and creative fulfilment of 
legal conditions and credit criteria to fool 
the creditors. 
Italy 
International 
Foot (2006), 
Dimitropoulos 
(2016) 
 Source: edited by the authors based on Storm and Nielsen (2017) 
 
Important statement by Storm and Nielsen (2017) that Kornai (1980) used SBC in vertical 
relationships between the state and economic micro-organizations. As a broader interpretation, 
a SBC can be interpreted as a relationship between an organization and its environment (Kornai 
et al, 2003). In professional football we can find this broader interpretation but the Hungarian 
case seems more like the vertical relationship between state and clubs in the socialist. 
Franck (2014) highlights that the mechanism leading to the result that “clubs can incur 
debt without fear” is similar to the mechanism known as “too big to fail” from the banking 
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sector. Franck (2014) to his knowledge the first sports economist linking footballs’ permanent 
and inbuilt financial crisis to the theory of Soft Budget Constraints (SBC) pioneered by Kornai 
(1980) has been Wladimir Andreff (2011) but in Hungary, András (2003) identified the SBC 
phenomenon in socialistic countries’ football in her dissertation. In table 3 we summarize the 
articles focus on the SBC application in different industries and professional football. 
 
Table 3: Understanding of the SBC in professional football 
Industry/Period Socialist Capitalist 
General Kornai, 1980, 1986b Kornai et al (2003) 
Rosta (2015) 
Fogel, Morck and Yeung (2008) 
Kornai (2009) 
Levaggi and Montefiori (2013) 
Baskaran (2012) 
Bohle (2014) 
Katsimi, Moutos, Pagoulatos and Sotiropoulos (2014) 
Benczes (2011) 
Inderst, Mueller and Münnich (2007) 
etc. 
Football András, 2003 Franck (2014) 
Franck and Lang (2014)  
Andreff (2011) 
Storm and Nielsen (2017)  
Storm and Nielsen (2015)  
Storm and Nielsen (2012) 
Storm (2012) 
Storm (2009) 
Rohde and Breuer (2016) 
Drut and Raballand (2012) 
Pieper and Wallebohr (2017) 
D’Andrea and Masciandaro (2016) 
Torricelli et al (2014) 
Yu, L et al (2017) 
Source: edited by the Authors based on Rosta (2015) 
 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
Our aim is to examine the presence of SBC in CEE football. We analyse the market revenues 
of football clubs to specify the efficiency of Hungarian clubs and to find the operating model 
of them (business or state model). Can we identify the categories of soft operation based on 
Kornai (1980) and Storm&Nielsen (2017) in the CEE region and Hungary? Does SBC cause 
inefficiency in sport results of Hungarian football? 
Throughout this paper we used the following method: through secondary research we 
present the achievements and business functioning of CEE-region football with the help of 
existing international literature and UEFA report (UEFA, 2016) and studies that present deep 
13 
 
analyses about revenues of football clubs. The paper identified successful Central-Eastern-
European championships and clubs. This identification helped to evaluate the efficiency of 
Hungarian football in the regional environment.  
 
Results and discussion 
Figure 1 shows that among CEE countries Poland seems to operate mostly by the business 
model. Polish clubs have many customers and based on it they can realize income from other 
markets like as sponsorship, TV-rights and merchandising. 
Figure 1: Distribution of market revenues in CEE countries 
 
Source: edited by the authors based on UEFA (2016) and transfermarkt.de 
Czech Republic and Romania should be partly business-oriented. According to transfer 
revenues, clubs from Croatia and Serbia can apply the transfer strategy so they can realize 
revenues without high number of consumers thanks to transfer incomes from selling players. 
Other countries (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary) have weaker sport results (András-
Havran, 2016). Among them, Hungarian clubs have much more revenues but it seems not to 
arrive from the market rather from the state (soft incomes). The question is: Why are the 
Hungarian sponsors so active without high number of spectators or TV-viewers? Hungarian 
club football is one of the weakest in the CEE region and it can be caused by SBC. We looked 
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at the six viewpoint by Storm and Nielsen (2017) and we give some example for the presence 
of SBC in Hungarian football in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Examination of Hungarian clubs by the criterias of the SBC 
SBC Criteria Example from Hungarian football Source 
Soft pricing Public stadiums are made available to football 
clubs by local government at below market fees – 
for example in Szombathely 
TV-rights purchased by Hungarian national TV 
above market price 
www.szombathely.hu/kozgyules/e-
kozgyules/download.73744/ 
http://sportbiznisz.blog.hu/2017 
/03/30/kozel_19_milliard_ 
forintot_er_a_magyar_labdarugas_a_koz
tevenek 
Soft taxation Tax exemptions, special rules for football 
companies: corporate tax advantage, personal 
taxes, etc. 
Law about corporate tax: 2014/LXXIV.; 
Law about similar personal taxes: 
2017/LXXVII.  
Soft 
subsidies 
Subsidies from state (through state companies, 
B2B companies, etc.) – for example companies 
wholly owned by local government give subsidies 
to Ferencváros 
https://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/csak-
az-allami-milliardok-tartjak-eletben-a-
magyar-focit.232654.html 
Soft credits Capital increase or shareholder loan without 
repayment 
 
Soft 
investments 
The Hungarian government paid 600 bn HUF for 
sport facility building and improvement 
(including several football stadiums of 
professional clubs) 
http://mstt.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Le%CC%81tesi
%CC%81tme%CC%81nyfejleszte%CC
%81s-2017-Nyerges-Miha%CC%81ly-
Emle%CC%81kkonferencia-
20180123.pdf 
Soft 
accounting 
Less information about the real activity of 
football clubs in the financial statements 
 
Source: edited by the authors 
 
Franck (2014) highlights the following what can be very important in case of the decision-
makers of Hungarian professional football: “In the extreme case that a club has a perfectly soft 
budget constraint, its own price-elasticity of demand is zero, which means that the vertical 
demand curve for player talent – the crucial input into football production – is only determined 
by other variables and not by the price (Kornai 1986b).” Furthermore, “the absence of what 
Kornai (1986b) called “dead-serious” considerations of revenues and supply can induce 
managerial negligence. As the continuation of operations is not at stake, decision-makers do 
not invest enough of their own time and energy into sorting out bad projects and developing 
good projects. “Money coming like manna” (Kornai 1986b) induces waste and lavishness.” 
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Conclusions 
Both professional and financial competitiveness of the CEE region can be considered weak in 
European football but transfer market income can be evaluated efficient. There is a big 
difference between clubs and championships even within the region, still, there are clubs in the 
region that can be considered competitive in international competitions. The international trend 
that sport success is concentrated can be noticed also in this region, too, and it also means the 
concentration of players’ value and financial success.  
The CEE region takes part in the international players market on the supply side, with 
increasingly younger players and an internationally relevant turnover. Free flow of workforce 
within the European Union resulted in migration from Central-Eastern-Europe in many 
industries, it has grown in football as well, as players count as locals because they are citizens 
of the European Union. Traditionally stronger championships and clubs can provide bigger 
salaries and can buy out players of their contracts from smaller championships and clubs, 
because they have a bigger market share. In the CEE region number of consumers is lower, and 
their solvency is also weaker than that of Western-European ones, however, they have a cost 
advantage regarding building infrastructure, maintenance, payroll and service costs. These can 
be complemented by support through national tax, and in case of their currency becoming 
weaker, advantages stemming from exchange rates. 
By using their resources efficiently and building on the above listed competitive 
advantages, a Central-Eastern-European championship or club can establish its future success. 
Clubs of some countries like as Hungary cannot operate effectively thanks to excessive state 
subsidies and SBC. A small country (with lower number of consumers) like as Hungary has to 
focus on the improvement of youth system and support of talented players to get top football 
leagues as young as possible. Based on audit of academy system of Hungarian football made 
by the Double Pass international company (MLSZ, 2016) and other research (Havran, 2017) it 
can be stated that career support and preparation for professional life for Hungarian players can 
be evaluated as weak compared to the closest competitors, that is, the Central-Eastern-European 
region. 
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Table 5: Summary of conclusions 
  Western Europe Central and Eastern Europe 
Primary financing 
sources 
1. From the market 
2. Money injection from the owner 
1. From the state 
2. Market and owners’ injection 
Primary role of the 
budget limit 
Hard budget limit for general 
operation but soft in the case of 
transfers 
Soft budget limit in general, but we can 
find business examples (Poland, Croatia, 
etc.) 
Characteristic of 
ownership 
Mostly presence of real ownership Mostly no real owner 
  
Sport professional 
success 
International success Lack of success in international 
championships 
Primary role of 
football 
Service as a field of the entertainment 
industry 
Synergy stretegy – international 
business and political influence 
Efficiency in core business 
To meet the political expectations 
Inefficiency in core business 
Source: edited by the authors 
 
According to the reviewed literature, many top football clubs from Western Europe operates 
according to the SBC phenomenon, but these clubs have real owners and clubs can realise 
significant part of their revenues from the market. The sugar-daddy owners of these clubs 
support the teams because of synergy with other companies from another industry of special 
political aims. In CEE, and in Hungary, clubs often have not got any real owner, football 
companies owned by non-profit organizations which mostly supported by the state. Compare 
to other CEE leagues it seems that less subsidy by the state can be mean better sport results for 
clubs and for national teams too. 
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